A man named in an FIR in a matrimonial dispute had moved the Delhi High Court as his recruitment to the post of sub-inspector was kept pending till the final outcome of the case. The Delhi High Court recently observed that merely being named in an FIR is not an impediment for a public appointment, unless the involvement is substantiated by investigation, especially in relation to matrimonial offences. A division bench of Justice V Kameswar Rao and Justice Anoop Kumar Mendiratta in its May 31 order said, “The competent authority as well as the learned tribunal appear to have ignored the fact that there is a growing tendency amongst the women to rope in all the relatives including minors in case an FIR is lodged with reference to matrimonial disputes. Many of such complaints are eventually either settled between the families/spouses and are later on stated to have been filed in the heat of the moment over trivial issues.” The court further added, “The abuse of the aforesaid provision has been substantially noticed though the salutary purpose of the enactment cannot be ignored in any manner. Merely naming in the FIR does not lead to an inference that the employer can keep in abeyance the employment of an applicant for an indefinite period, even if the applicant…has not been summoned.” The high court was hearing a plea challenging a February 20 order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) which set aside a December 2, 2020, order issued by the deputy commissioner of police, Recruitment NPL, Delhi, thereby keeping the recruitment of a man to the post of sub-inspector (Exe) in Delhi Police pending, till the final outcome of the proceedings arising out of an FIR. The CAT did not interfere with the authority’s order. However, it said that the man’s candidature shall not be cancelled till the disposal of the case in FIR. The FIR had been registered by the sister-in-law of the man implicating all members of the family. The offences mentioned in the FIR included sections 498A (husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty) and 506 (criminal intimidation), among others.
The court was informed that a chargesheet was filed on November 1, 2019 wherein the name of the man was reflected in ‘Column 12’. The cognizance was taken by the trial court but he was not summoned since he was placed in Column 12 – Column 12 pertains to people against whom no evidence has been found; however, their involvement cannot be ruled out. The court observed that the petitioner’s name was placed in Column 12 of the chargesheet and that the “evidence did not establish his involvement in aforesaid offences after investigation, he should have been logically considered suitable for appointment”. The bench ruled that merely being named in the FIR “cannot be treated as an impediment for public appointment”, unless the involvement is substantiated on “investigation, specially in relation to matrimonial offences”. The court further observed that the man was better placed than the cases involving trial as an accused, wherein after summoning, the proceedings need to be evaluated on the yardstick of “honourable acquittal, technical acquittal or if the benefit of doubt has been extended to accused”. “Unfortunately, in the present case, the learned tribunal misdirected itself by assuming that the petitioner could be summoned having being placed in Column No. 12 of the chargesheet or may be summoned under Section 319 CrPC during the course of trial,” the high court said. The bench also observed that there was nothing else on record to reflect that the antecedents of the man disqualified him for appointment to the post of sub-inspector (Exe) in Delhi Police. It further said that it is difficult to presume that the man would be a “threat to the discipline of the police force” merely because an FIR had been registered where he had not even been summoned. The high court set aside the orders passed by the authorities as well as CAT, further directing the authorities to appoint the man to the concerned post, subject to his satisfying all other conditions within a period of four weeks from the passing of the order.