Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 —Sec, 21(c) — Special Leave Petition— Appeal against conviction and sentence—observation- no good reason for us to disturb the impugned judgment of the High Court dismissing the appeal- there is something which we have noticed and must not be ignored- High Court seems to be labouring under a serious misconception of law so far as the interpretation of Section 32-B of the NDPS Act is concerned—efer to the decision of this Court in Gurdev Singh vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2021) 6 SCC 558. In the said case, it was held that the court should be guided by the factors mentioned in Section 32-B — NDPS Act and other relevant factors while imposing a sentence higher than the minimum- factors mentioned in Section 32-B of the NDPS Act are in addition to other relevant facts, and it cannot be said that the minimum sentence under the NDPS Act is to be considered as a maximum sentence- held- court has a wide discretion to impose the sentence/imprisonment ranging between 10 years to 20 years and while imposing such sentence/imprisonment in addition, the court may also take into consideration other factors as enumerated in Sections 32-B(a) to (f)- while imposing a punishment higher than the minimum sentence, if the court has considered such factor as it may deem fit other than the factors enumerated in Sections 32- B(a) to (f), the High Court has to only consider whether "such factor" is a relevant factor or not- understanding of the High Court so far as Section 32-B of the NDPS is concerned is that the minimum sentence should be considered as maximum sentence- not the correct understanding of Section 32-B of the NDPS Act- do not want to interfere with that part of the order of the High Court reducing the sentence— petition dismissed
Held: (Para 17-21)
Result: Petition dismissedCases Referred:1. Rafiq Qureshi Vs. Narcotic Control Bureau Eastern Zonal Unit, (2019) 6 SCC 4922. Sakshi Vs. Union of India, (2004) 5 SCC 518 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1645],3. Raj Kumar Bajpaee Vs. Union of India, (2016) 95 ACC 896]4. Krishna Murari Pal Vs. State of U.P., 2015 SCC OnLine All 4909]5. Ram Asre Vs. State of U.P., 2017 SCC OnLine All 28916. Krishna Murari Pal Vs. State of U.P., 2015 SCC OnLine All 49097. Ram Asre [Ram Asre Vs. State of U.P., 2017 SCC OnLine All 2891]8. Sakshi Vs. Union of India, reported in (2004) 5 SCC 5189. Gurdev Singh Vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2021) 6 SCC 558
Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court which has reversed the findings of the learned Single Judge and has thereby upheld the selections made by the State of Punjab for the posts of Assistant Professors and Librarians in Government Degree colleges of Punjab-observation— quashing of the entire recruitment process may cause hardships for the selected candidates, but at the same time, there is no equity in the favour of selected candidates as challenge to the recruitment was made during the pendency of the process and appointments were subject to the Court orders. A gross illegality like the present recruitment cannot be ignored- giving away of a rigorous criteria laid down in the UGC regulations with a single, multiple-choice question based written test, and the complete elimination of the viva-voce, all establish the arbitrary nature of the exercise which cannot pass the test of reasonableness laid down under Article 14 of the Constitution. Hence, the learned Single Judge had rightly struck down the entire selection process, and the Division Bench of the High Court erred in interfering with that conclusion- held- the State has miserably failed to justify the departure from the standard norms of the recruitment process. It has failed to give any valid reason for not adopting the UGC Regulations and avoiding the Public Service Commission in the recruitment in question. Moreover, as discussed earlier, the reason for this departure were narrow political and clearly arbitrary— allow these appeals and set aside the order dated 23.09.2024 passed by the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and quash the entire recruitment and direct the State to initiate the recruitment process as per the 2018 UGC Regulations which are now in force in the State of Punjab.
Held: (Para 58-61)
Result: Appeals allowed
CGST Act, 2017 —Sec. 129(5) - Civil Appeal- Appellant was a registered dealer in Red Arecanut operating from Channagiri, Davangere, Karnataka. In 2022, it consigned 17,850 kg of dry Arecanut valued at Rs. 51,72,930/-, packed into 255 bags to one M/s. Diamond Trading Company, Delhi through a vehicle accompanied by E-Way Bill- During transit, the goods were transhipped and loaded onto another vehicle for onward journey to Delhi. However, only 248 bags were loaded onto the new vehicle, with 7 bags missing from the original consignment- said vehicle was detained by the Mobile Squad and the driver's statement was recorded in Form GST- Following physical inspection, a report was generated alleging certain deficiencies- detention order was also issued and subsequently, a notice under Section 129(3) of the CGST Act was issued, highlighting the discrepancy of 7 missing bags and the resulting shortfall in quantity from 18220 kg to 17670 kg- Appellant submitted a representation seeking an order to enable it to pursue statutory remedies and the Mobile Squad Official stated that the Appellant's representative orally requested withdrawal of earlier reply and sought release of goods, and hence, no further proceedings were deemed necessary- Appellant denied having made any such request and sent further communications seeking a copy of the order, if any. Receiving no response, it approached the High Court, which dismissed its Writ Petition- Appellant submitted a representation seeking an order to enable it to pursue statutory remedies and the Mobile Squad Official stated that the Appellant's representative orally requested withdrawal of earlier reply and sought release of goods, and hence, no further proceedings were deemed necessary- Appellant denied having made any such request and sent further communications seeking a copy of the order, if any. Receiving no response, it approached the High Court, which dismissed its Writ Petition- Hence the present appeal- observation- "While Section 129(5) of the CGST Act, 2017 provides that proceedings shall be deemed to be concluded upon payment of tax and penalty, this deeming fiction cannot be interpreted to imply that the assessee has agreed to waive or abandon the right to challenge the levy - a right that is protected by the very enactment itself. The term "conclusion" as used in Section 129(5) merely signifies that no further proceedings for prosecution will be initiated- does not absolve the responsibility of the proper officer to pass an order concluding the proceedings - principles of natural justice mandate that when a taxpayer submits a response to a show cause notice, the adjudicating authority is required to consider such response and render a reasoned, speaking order. This is not a mere procedural formality, but a substantive safeguard ensuring fairness in quasijudicial proceedings. The right to appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act, 2017, is predicated upon the existence of a formal adjudication. An appeal can lie only against an 'order', and in the absence of a reasoned order passed under Section 129(3) of the Act, the taxpayer is effectively deprived of the statutory remedy of appeal-Such a deprivation undermines the foundational principles of fairness, due process, and access to justice, rendering the right of appeal illusory or nugatory. It is now settled law that failure to issue a speaking order in response to a show cause notice creates a legal vacuum. Any consequential action including imposition of tax or penalty, would then be unsupported by authority of law, thereby potentially violating Article 265 of the Constitution of India, which prohibits the levy or collection of tax except by authority of law- held- there must be much more than an abandonment of a right to plead waiver or acquiescence and the payment, by itself, cannot be treated as a waiver or abandonment, especially when the Appellant has clearly objected to the demand and when there is a statutory mandate to pass an order and a corresponding right to Appeal. "It is now settled law that failure to issue a speaking order in response to a show cause notice creates a legal vacuum. Any consequential action including imposition of tax or penalty, would then be unsupported by authority of law, thereby potentially violating Article 265 of the Constitution of India, which prohibits the levy or collection of tax except by authority of law- Proper Officer was under a clear statutory obligation to pass a final order under Section 129(3) of CGST Act and the refusal by the High Court to direct the passing of such an Order, has the effect of frustrating the Appellant's statutory right to Appeal and is contrary to well established legal principles governing tax adjudication and procedural fairness. Accordingly, the Apex Court allowed the Appeal, set aside the High Court's Judgment, and directed the Respondent to pass a reasoned final Order.
Held: (Para 12-22)
Result: Appeal allowed
Constitution of India,1950 — Art. 14 and 21, 32 — An incident of fire at a store—room in the bungalow premises allotted to him-burnt currency notes were discovered in the store-room-a three-member Committee was constituted by the Chief Justice of India-to call for initiation of proceedings for removal of the Petitioner from his office—A Judge of the Supreme Court shall not be removed from his office except by an order of the President- if the conduct of a Judge of a High Court amounts to misbehaviour but does not amount to such misbehaviour as would warrant the extreme measure of removal from office —President of India is not a stranger to the judicial process-Petitioner not object to the photographs/video footage being uploaded, he participated in the inquiry without demur-a waiver of a Fundamental Right is unexceptionable— CJI has scrupulously followed the Procedure.
Held: ( Para 2,7,9,17,25,39,65, 69,73, 89,94,110,121,125)
Result: Petition Dismissed .
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High court (hereinafter referred to as the "Impugned Order") in Second Appeal by which the Second Appeal filed the respondents herein; the original defendants, came to be allowed thereby setting aside the judgment and order passed by the First Appellate Court allowing the First Appeal filed by the appellants herein; the original plaintiffs, and decreeing the suit in their favour- observation- that providing merely an information with regard to the fact of death is not sufficient compliance of the Rule 10A of the CPC— Unless and until the counsel furnishes the information with regard to the details of the persons on whom and against whom the right to sue survives and the information under Rule 10A of the CPC. and the object behind it would remain incomplete as the parties would still be labouring to inquire who are the legal representatives and find out as to upon whom and against whom the right to sue survives— held— set aside a judgment passed by the High Court, which had abated a second appeal due to the non-substitution of deceased respondents, holding that mere intimation of a party's death does not amount to sufficient compliance with Order XXII Rule 10A of the Code of Civil Procedure—The Court observed that there is an obligation on the pleader not only to inform the court of the death but also to disclose the legal heirs upon whom the right to sue survives- appeal succeeds and is hereby partly allowed- impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside.
Held: (Para 73-79)
Result: Appeal partly allowed
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